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This paper motivates the use of intelligent decision-making algorithms onboard UAS as a 
means to reduce risk, particularly in anomalous or failure situations, in a manner that 
ultimately will enable safety certification for UAS operations throughout the National 
Airspace System (NAS).  We begin with an overview of Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) 
that must be adapted before they can be applied to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).  We 
restrict attention to Aircraft (Subchapter C) and Airmen (Subchapter D) FARs in this 
paper.  Specifically, we examine the regulations associated with normal and utility aircraft 
airworthiness (Part 23) and pilot certification (Part 61), making the assumption that UAS 
will initially be routinely operated in lightly-used airspace over rural areas currently 
occupied primarily by Part 23 aircraft operated by Part 61 airmen following Part 91 
(general) operating rules.  We propose a set of metrics by which both autonomous and 
ground-supervised risk mitigation strategies can be evaluated during the certification 
process to maximize the likelihood that UAS are safe when routinely operated in the NAS.  
I. Introduction 
stablishing Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) airworthiness requirements for safety certification is difficult due 
to regulations originally written for manned aircraft and due to the wide variation in UAS platforms, missions, 
and operating environments. As an interim measure to enable UAS operations prior to formidable overhead required 
to formally redraft and enact FARs that accommodate UAS, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has 
interpreted the existing Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)
1
 within the Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs) 
originally intended for manned aircraft for UAS. Current FARs classify aircraft by weight but ignore operating 
region and mission.  Current FARs also presume the existence of “souls onboard”.  Certainly the UAS is distinct in 
that failures do not pose severe consequences (risk) unless the UAS collides with a manned aircraft or flies into 
terrain occupied by people or property.  In fact, it is standard procedure for a UAS to terminate its flight given an 
anomalous event (e.g., lost link) so long as the overflight region is undeveloped and unpopulated.   
Conservative application of weight-based, manned-aircraft CFRs to new UAS operations
2
 has stifled UAS 
operations in the NAS.  While regulatory officials and congressional legislation may ultimately approve documents 
that preserve free flight for hobbyists and potentially also allow academics to fly small UAS locally without 
Certificates of Authorization (CoAs), these efforts are not expected to facilitate NAS access for general commercial 
or military users, particularly over long-range flights.  UAS-specific FARs that classify by operating region as a 
minimum can appropriately focus attention on risk, which will certainly be acceptable for low-altitude UAS 
operations over unpopulated/undeveloped areas.  Opening rural Class G airspace will greatly increase the ability of 
UAS to mature and gain trust from the community.
3
 
Ultimately, the FARs need to support more than Class G UAS operations since many commercial and DoD UAS 
opportunities will require flight in urban areas,
4
 near busy airports, and at all altitudes.  To support urban UAS 
operations, operating area must be augmented by other attributes for which risk can be assessed to most 
appropriately define airworthiness standards.  Once UAS-centric FARs are approved, airworthiness certification 
categories should allow UAS to equitably operate
5
 in all airspace classes, with categories or “levels” appropriately 
matching certification stringency with operational risk from “no risk” (thus few certification requirements) to “high 
risk” (with manned-equivalent certification standards).  
As we move from pilot skill and ingenuity to sophisticated avionics and data links as principle risk mitigators, 
we must adopt safety certification processes that are based on analytical models of the algorithms and software and 
are based on a concept of minimizing risk to people and property rather than to the vehicle.  Given that the vehicle 
itself can be lost, and that small UAS in particular will not be competitive unless lightweight and low cost, 
electromechanical redundancy requirements must be minimized.  This implies that UAS must be certifiable despite a 
nontrivial risk of losing the functionality of a critical component or subsystem.  This, in turn, implies the UAS must 
be capable of adapting, in real-time, to such failures in a manner that will avoid loss-of-control in high-risk 
environments and that will enable onboard systems, especially under real-time pressures or with lost link, to 
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autonomously manage the flight by computing alternate safe flight trajectories, broadcasting the nature of the 
disability along with updated intentions (if possible), then executing altered flight plans through safe landing or 
flight termination in an area where an impact poses acceptably-low risk. 
Below, we first summarize safety certification requirements in existing FARs, focusing on example content in 
two sections, Airworthiness Standards for normal/utility airplanes (Part 23) and Certification for Pilots (Part 61).  
These sections were chosen because the UAS, especially the small surveillance UAS, will operate more like a 
general aviation “spectator” than as a scheduled or unscheduled “air carrier” transporting people or cargo. We then 
propose example modifications to a subset of these FARs appropriate for modern UAS equipped with full datalink, 
sensing, and onboard flight management capabilities.  To enable UAS operation without reliance on continuous link 
to a ground operator/pilot even during anomalies, we propose certification requirements that rely upon, rather than 
accommodate as an option, intelligent systems tools that can ultimately maintain acceptable levels of risk in 
anomalous as well as nominal situations.  Although software/system validation and verification (V&V) are key 
elements of safety certification, we focus on anomaly management and procedures by which adaptive or intelligent 
elements can be injected without compromising V&V of deterministic thus provable capabilities exercised during 
normal flight operations.  We present candidate metrics by which these FARs can ultimately be deemed acceptable 
(or not).  Such metrics are keys to ensuring certification decisions are analytic rather than ad hoc, especially given 
the nontrivial complexity of UAS. 
II. Summary of Relevant Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) 
Each civil aircraft in the United States is authorized to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS) based on 
issuance of an Airworthiness Certificate. These certificates are issued in two varieties, either a Special Airworthiness 
Certificate or a Standard Airworthiness Certificate.  The Standard Airworthiness Certificate issued for most mass-
produced aircraft is based on a production certificate, which is in turn based on a type certificate – really a design 
approval – issued by the FAA to the aircraft producer when the producer demonstrates that all airworthiness 
standards have been met or exceeded.  These airworthiness standards are specified by the FARs for civil aircraft 
based on a division into aircraft “categories” roughly predicated on weight, means of propulsion (e.g. airplane, 
rotorcraft, balloon), and intended operations.  These standards have evolved as a means to protect the passengers and 
crew onboard the aircraft, with additional considerations for other aircraft and personnel and property on the ground. 
The basic aircraft categories recognized by the FAA for purposes of type certification, and subsequent issue of 
airworthiness certificates, are Normal Airplane, Utility Airplane, Acrobatic Airplane, Commuter Airplane, Transport 
Airplane, Normal Rotorcraft, Transport Rotorcraft, and Manned Free Balloons.   The airworthiness standards are 
detailed for these categories in CFRs 23, 25, 27, 29, and 31, and the process of type certification and issuance of 
airworthiness certificates themselves is found in CFR 21.  This presumably constitutes the bulk of aircraft certified 
by the FAA, but many do not fit into these categories and must have an alternative means of certification in order to 
fly.  UAS and numerous other aircraft operate under this alternate means of authorization by way of Special 
Airworthiness Certificates.  The FAA special airworthiness certificate authorizes aircraft to operate in the U.S. 
airspace and is issued in one or more of the following categories:  Primary, Restricted, Limited, Light Sport, or 
Provisional Airworthiness Certificates, Experimental Certificates, and Special Flight Permits.  These categories are 
specific to the Special Airworthiness Certificate, and they are delineated in a less detailed way in CFR 21 than the 
basic types above are defined in CFRs 23-31.  In particular, CFR 21 offers little technical detail, often referring back 
to the CFRs describing the basic categories above. 
Civil UAS currently fall into the Experimental category and are listed on the FAA web page referring to that 
category, but unlike various other experimental platforms they are not specifically called out in the actual wording 
of CFR 21.   This is indicative of the uncertainties on exactly how we should regulate this new type of aircraft.  It is 
also problematic because the regulations place a limit of one year on a certificate issued in the experimental 
category.  While this may have been sufficient for manned flight testing it does not allow for full operational testing 
or deployment of UAS (for example, long duration Arctic missions), and it is extremely prohibitive in terms of 
economic development for companies pursuing the use of UAS for commercial purposes.  This is a stark contrast to 
the explicit statement in CFR 21.181 (a) (4) which grants unlimited duration for amateur-built aircraft, kit-built 
aircraft, light-sport aircraft, air racing, and exhibition.  The economic viability of UAS warrants at least the same 
level of acceptance once UAS are shown to introduce “acceptable” risk to people and property.   
It is a challenge for the FAA to certify UAS because regulators must search through standards from multiple 
CFRs and other sources that were developed prior to consideration of UAS as an aircraft category.  Advisory 
Circular 91-57 from 1981 establishes operating standards for model aircraft; this AC has now persisted for three 


























































avoid operation in the presence of spectators until aircraft is successfully flight-tested, avoid operation higher than 
400 feet above ground level (AGL), avoid flying near full-scale [manned] aircraft, use observers if possible, and 
notify an airport operator if flying within three nautical miles of an airport.  Because the “enjoyment” associated 
with model aircraft operations can be obtained through line-of-sight flight at low altitudes over unpopulated sites, 
numerous safety issues arising for general UAS operations, ultimately conducted in shared airspace and over 
populated as well as rural areas, were not necessary to address in AC 91-57.  We therefore will require a more 
comprehensive regulatory structure, based on formal augmentations and modifications to the CFRs, to ensure new 
UAS operations maintain acceptable risk to people and valuable property.   
Just the brief review of the CFRs above cited six different CFR parts, and most of those contain numerous pages 
of detailed technical specifications.  A regulatory process must be developed that is specific to UAS and that will 
apply to the most general extent possible to both proposed and predicted platforms and use cases.  Such regulations 
will make this process easier and more efficient, ultimately enabling UAS of all types and uses to operate routinely. 
Examination of existing standards will allow the UAS and regulatory communities to obtain a clear picture of which 
regulations can be directly applied to UAS and which cannot.  UAS will likely still be categorized to an extent on 
weight, but flight performance characteristics, mission, and operating environment will also be important factors.  
UAS operations will be referenced to the existing CFRs for similar and dissimilar platforms.  For example, the use 
of applicable “consensus standards” in the certification of light sport aircraft is reasonable to apply to UAS, both 
from the business use perspective and that of maintaining safety.  On the other end of the spectrum, CFR 23.141 
makes certification contingent on meeting standards “without requiring exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or 
strength,” suggesting that UAS safety should also be based on averages rather than an overly-ambitious threshold 
applied simply because the system is unmanned.   
While a comprehensive rewrite of even a single CFR section is beyond the scope of this paper, our goal is to 
show by example that such an analysis is possible and in fact essential to progressing toward formal certification of 
UAS for operation in the NAS.  Example CFRs contained in Parts 23 (Aircraft) and 61 (Airmen) are therefore 
discussed in more detail below. 
III. Adapting Part 23:  From “Manned Aircraft” to “Aircraft” 
Table 1 summarizes the subparts of CFR Part 23, Airworthiness Standards:  Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and 
Commuter Category Airplanes (available online at http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=ecfr&sid=0379b6a8425e6b6e4d15e9f7595bda4a&rgn=div5&view=text&node=14:1.0.1.3.10&idno=14 ).  As 
illustrated by Table 1, the Part 23 CFRs are extensive.  A first step in parsing these CFRs for UAS is to classify them 
as:  applicable, applicable after revision, or irrelevant.  The set of “irrelevant” CFRs is nontrivial and in many cases 
unquestionably so (e.g., most of the Personnel and Cargo Accommodations CFRs). It may also be necessary to 
introduce new CFR topic areas that are critical for the certification of UAS but not for manned aircraft, most 
obviously inclusion of the datalink and ground station as critical and necessary augmentations to the traditional 
“aircraft” which previously consisted strictly of the flight hardware and (onboard) cockpit to support the flight crew.   
Consider the Controllability and Maneuverability CFRs (23.143-23.157) as an example CFR series that must be 
adapted for UAS, and in fact for fly-by-wire for Part 23 aircraft.  CFR 23.143 (General) states:  “(a) The airplane 
must be safely controllable and maneuverable during all flight phases including—(1) Takeoff; (2) Climb; (3) Level 
flight; (4) Descent; (5) Go-around; and (6) Landing (power on and power off) with the wing flaps extended and 
retracted.     (b) It must be possible to make a smooth transition from one flight condition to another (including turns 
and slips) without danger of exceeding the limit load factor, under any probable operating condition (including, for 
multiengine airplanes, those conditions normally encountered in the sudden failure of any engine).    (c) If marginal 
conditions exist with regard to required pilot strength, the control forces necessary must be determined by 
quantitative tests. In no case may the control forces under the conditions specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section exceed those prescribed in the following table.  [This table, omitted here for brevity, specifies values in 
pounds force applied to the relevant controls (stick, wheel, rudder pedal) for temporary and prolonged 
application.]”  Parts (a) and (b) of this CFR are general thus applicable to platforms for which a software-based 
autopilot is responsible for issuing control commands.  Part (c) is not applicable to UAS, and is also not really 
applicable to fly-by-wire systems, as it prescribes pilot “strength requirements” appropriate for aircraft with 
mechanical linkages between pilot stick/wheel/rudder pedals and the aircraft control surfaces.
†
  At face value, this 
CFR suggests a simple translation of this part (c) CFR to servo/motor actuation torque requirements, the specific 
                                                 
† FAR 25.143, the analogous regulation for transport aircraft, includes verbage to limit applied control force to aircraft with “conventional wheel 
type controls”.  FAR 25.143 also contains text to constrain stick force limits to not being “so low that the airplane can easily be overstressed 


























































numerical values for which would be a function of the maximum torques each servo/motor must apply in marginal 
or worst-case (e.g., high-speed) flight conditions.  However, embedded in this CFR is the implicit assumption that a 
pilot (or autopilot) must always maintain authority to move control surfaces.  A pilot-centric translation of the 
“control force requirement” statement might be “the pilot (or remote operator) must be able to manipulate the 
control surfaces under all nominal and marginal operational conditions”.  A more general translation applicable 
across pilot/autopilot modes is “control surface manipulation must be possible across all nominal and marginal 
operational conditions”.  This implies that the pilot/autopilot system must be able to compute and reliably execute 
commands.  This requires software and fly-by-wire (or mechanical) hardware to function properly under all 
conditions.  If a ground-based pilot is safety-critical for UAS control under marginal conditions, this CFR also 
requires adequate pilot controls on the ground and a reliable bidirectional aircraft - ground communication link. 
  
Table 1:  CFR Part 23 Contents.
1 
Subpart Topic CFR Sections 
A (General) - 23.1 – 23.3 
B (Flight) General 23.21-23.33 
 Performance 23.45-23.77 
 Flight Characteristics 23.141 
 Controllability and Maneuverability 23.143-23.157 
 Trim 23.161 
 Stability, Stalls & Spinning 23.171-23.221 
 Ground & Water Handling Characteristics 23.231-23.239 
 Miscellaneous Flight Requirements 23.251-23.253 
C (Structure) General 23.301-23.307 
 Flight Loads; Control Surface and System Loads 23.321-23.415 
 Horiz. Stabilizing, Balancing, Vertical Surfaces 23.421-23.445 
 Ailerons and Special Devices 23.455-23.459 
 Ground Loads / Water Loads 23.471-23.537 
 Emergency Landing Conditions 23.561-23.562 
 Fatigue Evaluation 23.571-23.575 
D (Design&Const.) General 23.601-34.629 
 Wings 23.641 
 Control Surfaces & Control Systems 23.651-23.703 
 Landing Gear; Floats and Hulls 23.721-23.757 
 Personnel and Cargo Accommodations 23.771-23.831 
 Pressurization 23.841-23.843 
 Fire Protection 23.851-23.865 
 Electrical Bonding & Lightning Protection 23.867 
 Miscellaneous (Leveling means) 23.871 
E (Powerplant) General 23.901-23.943 
 Fuel System / Fuel System Components 23.951-23.1001 
 Oil System, Cooling/Liquid Cooling 23.1011-23.1063 
 Induction System 23.1091-23.1111 
 Exhaust System 23.1121-23.1125 
 Powerplant Controls/Accessories/Fire Prot. 23.1141-23.1203 
F (Equipment) General 23.1301-23.1309 
 Instruments:  Installation 23.1311-23.1337 
 Electrical Systems and Equipment 23.1351-23.1367 
 Lights, Safety, Miscellaneous Equipment 23.1381-23.1461 
G (Oper. Limit./Info.) General 23.1401-23.1529 
 Markings and Placards 23.1541-23.1567 
 Airplane Flight Manual; Approved Material 23.1581-23.1589 
CFR 23.145, on longitudinal control, states (subtopic headers are in bold):  “(a) With the airplane as nearly as 
possible in trim at 1.3 VS1, it must be possible, at speeds below the trim speed, to pitch the nose downward so that 
the rate of increase in airspeed allows prompt acceleration to the trim speed with— (1) Maximum continuous power 
on each engine; (2) Power off; and (3) Wing flap and landing gear— (i) retracted, and  (ii) extended.  (b) Unless 
otherwise required, it must be possible to carry out the following maneuvers without requiring the application of 
single-handed control forces exceeding those specified in §23.143(c)… [series of specific maneuvers is omitted for 


























































capability of 1.5 g must be demonstrated to provide a margin to recover from upset or inadvertent speed increase.  
(d) It must be possible, with a pilot control force of not more than 10 pounds, to maintain a speed of not more than 
VREF during a power-off glide with landing gear and wing flaps extended, for any weight of the airplane, up to and 
including the maximum weight. (e) By using normal flight and power controls, except as otherwise noted in 
paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) of this section, it must be possible to establish a zero rate of descent at an attitude 
suitable for a controlled landing without exceeding the operational and structural limitations of the airplane… 
[specific conditions (e)(1) and (e)(2)omitted for brevity].”  CFR 23.145 (a) is largely applicable to UAS, given that a 
fixed-wing UAS may be simpler, operating with no flaps or landing gear.  CFR 23.145 (b) must be translated to the 
UAS in a manner similar to the translation of 23.143(c), with a requirement for the autopilot and/or ground-based 
pilot to be capable of carrying out a nominal list of longitudinal control maneuvers required throughout a flight.  
CFR 23.145(c) is directly translatable, although most UAS will be capable of greater than 1.5g maneuvers.  CFR 
23.145(d) and (e) again need verbage to require the autopilot and/or ground-based pilot to be capable of maintaining 
power-off glide and zero-rate-of-descent attitudes suitable for controlled landings.  Note that the companion CFR for 
transport (25.145) is analogous but with focus on the use of high-lift devices. 
As examples of Part 23 CFRs that require more substantial rewrite, consider the Part 23 CFRs for Emergency 
Landing Conditions, §23.561 (general) and §23.562 (dynamic conditions).  These CFRs stipulate requirements (e.g., 
g loads) for which aircraft must be designed to protect occupants.  These CFRs are extensive, with 
acceleration/deceleration limits specified for each direction relative to the occupant, with specifics on motion of 
components including restraints and seats during the dynamic landing event, and contact forces including a head 
injury criteria (HIC).  UAS have no occupants, thus it would be logical to classify these CFRs as irrelevant for UAS.  
Certainly 23.561 and 23.562 are irrelevant for UAS as written. Instead, UAS occupants and structures in the 
emergency landing environment on the ground must be considered.  CFRs appropriately (and realistically) 
regulating UAS emergency landing characteristics, likely varying by vehicle class (micro, small, large), would cut to 
the core of the safety certification requirement to “protect people and property”, thereby addressing the major safety-
related concerns about UAS.  Rather than rewrite 23.561 and 23.562 for UAS, we propose the addition of new UAS-
specific CFRs, e.g., 23.563 and 23.564, to describe constraints for UAS operations during emergency landing.  Note 
that the determination of specific values for “acceptable risk” is beyond the scope of this research, and it is not clear 
such numbers should be hard-coded into the CFRs. 
 
(a) The airplane, although it may be damaged or destroyed in emergency landing conditions, must be 
designed as prescribed in this section to protect people and property under those conditions. 
(b) If the aircraft is operating in an area known to pose no or acceptable risk to people/property on the 
ground, the aircraft must execute an immediate emergency landing or flight termination sequence to 
minimize risk to other aircraft or of transiting outside the safe operating area. 
(c) If the aircraft can reach a low-risk landing region, and total risk associated with transit to the low-risk site 
and landing is lower than risk associated with an immediate landing, the aircraft must be maneuvered to that 
site where it must execute an emergency landing or flight termination procedure.
‡
 
(d) If the aircraft must execute an emergency landing in an environment that may pose risk to people or 
property, these risks must be acceptable, or else the UAS must not operate in or near such environments.  
Procedures for executing such an emergency landing must be established through analysis and testing 
analogous to that described in CFRs 23.561 and 23.562 for manned aircraft.  Manufacturers must 
demonstrate that:  (i) Under the most common emergency landing scenarios (e.g., unmanageable winds or 
loss-of-thrust but intact airframe) an acceptably low impact energy is imparted to objects in the environment, 
(ii) Impact sites, even in a high-risk environment, will absorb the impact energy safely or will minimize risk. 
Figure 1:  Alternative Part 23 CFR for UAS Emergency Landing. 
 
Consider the small UAS ‘general’ emergency landing regulation, e.g., 23.563, proposed in Figure 1.  While such 
a regulation could appear oppressive at first glance, it can instead provide quantifiable means to certify UAS as 
acceptably safe even if there is nontrivial probability (e.g., greater than 10
-9
 per flight hour) of an emergency over or 
near a populated or improved area.  Such assurance is a valuable alternative to triple redundancy as a means for 
certification, particularly for micro to small UAS that must remain low-cost to be competitive.   
                                                 
‡ Specifics associated with estimating total risk are to be determined.  A ground-based UAS operator, given time, would upload a 


























































In this section, we have shown examples of Part 23 CFRs that require adaptation (e.g., 23.143) and replacement 
(e.g., 23.561) for applicability to UAS.  The identified differences, which cut across other CFRs more generally, are 
in migration from a piloted vehicle to an automatically-piloted vehicle, and in migration of safety constraints from 
protection of onboard occupants to protection of people and property in the environment. 
IV. Adapting Part 61:  From “Airmen” to “Remote Supervisors”  
CFR Part 61 specifies certification requirements for pilots, flight instructors, and ground (classroom) instructors.  
Subparts include:  A (General), B (Aircraft Ratings and Pilot Authorizations), C (Student Pilots), D (Recreational 
Pilots), E (Private Pilots), F (Commercial Pilots), G (Airline Transport Pilots), H (Flight Instructors…), I (Ground 
Instructors), J (Sport Pilots), and K (Flight Instructors with a Sport Pilot Rating).  The Sport Pilot categories, the 
newest Airmen classifications, were added in 2004 as an alternative that imposed fewer requirements than the 
standard Private Pilot rating.  The differences between supervising the UAS remotely versus residing onboard the 
aircraft being flown are substantial.  We therefore posit a new CFR subpart (potentially Subpart L?) will be most 
appropriate for UAS, and in fact it may be the case that multiple subparts are needed to distinguish the requirements 
for different classes of UAS operations (e.g., small vs. large platform, local versus long-range, low versus high-
altitude, surveillance versus transport).   
We are concerned with the “Airmen” who operate UAS.  Unlike Part 23, the Part 61 regulations are centered on 
the notion that the pilot is immersed in an environment from which the aircraft is operated.  Even in §61.1, 
applicability and definitions, the use of the phrase “in an aircraft” is commonplace, implying the pilot must 
physically reside in the aircraft to obtain, for example, aeronautical experience or cross-country time.  Perhaps one 
of the more controversial CFRs the FAA has adapted for UAS CoA operators is paragraph §61.23 regarding medical 
certificates.  Certainly there is no distinction between manned and unmanned aircraft operation in this CFR, but 
aside from commenting that a ground-based UAS operator is not exposed to a thin atmosphere or unusual g-forces, 
it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze an appropriate level of medical certification (if any) required for civil 
UAS operators. 
The role of the UAS “Airman” is still evolving, but it is generally viewed to be more supervisory than hands-on 
piloting.
2
  For this reason, knowledge-based testing requirements adapted from the General Part 61 regulations will 
likely be more relevant for UAS than will the existing practical testing CFRs.  To-date, the FAA appears to have 
adapted Subpart F (Commercial Pilot) regulations when possible to UAS operations, presuming the primary civil 
UAS user will have a commercial or military application rather than be operating “privately” or as a “sport pilot”.  
CFRs 61.121 through 61.133 currently apply to commercial pilots.  Applicability, eligibility and aeronautical 
knowledge requirements are mostly transferrable to UAS Airmen, except for 61.125 content regarding use of simple 
instruments such as a magnetic compass for manual pilotage.  Aeronautical knowledge in 61.125 is insufficient for 
UAS.  The operator must understand the available UAS instrumentation, communication protocols, operational 
modes and protocols.  The operator must understand the set of commands and the logic behind issuing each, and the 
operator must understand the meaning of data transmitted by the UAS.  The tradeoff in training is that the UAS 
supervisor need not be as proficient with “stick-and-rudder” flight control (§61.127 – Flight proficiency) as would a 
traditional general or commercial aviation pilot.  The operator must know how the UAS autopilot executes 
maneuvers, and must know when and why the UAS would not be able to execute a maneuver, but the UAS pilot 
need not be able to manually execute a pinpoint landing, for example.   The other Part 61 Subpart F regulations, 
focusing on privileges and hours of experience, including night flying, require practical adaptation to the UAS 
operator but are reasonable models of information to be included in UAS operator CFRs. 
V. Evaluation Metrics for Safety Certification 
The manned aircraft CFRs have evolved based on our long heritage of manned aviation.  While the remotely-
piloted aircraft community has existed for over half a century, this community has not been so careful to capture 
their experiences in a manner that facilitates translation to safety certification.  The UAS community is rapidly 
evolving, and safety certification standards must be sufficiently accommodating to support this evolution.  For this 
reason, it is important to develop evaluation metrics for safety certification that generalize to the extent possible.  
Our long-term goal, shared by others in the UAS community, is to develop a set of joint UAS {type-mission-
environment} attributes that translate to risk-based classification metrics, providing guidance in appropriate 
classification and definition of UAS-specific CFRs.  Identified metrics will be critical for developing and 
distinguishing a minimal but flexible set of UAS-related CFRs that support the spectrum of proposed and potential 
future surveillance, transport, recreation, etc. mission scenarios, environments from rural to urban, and platform 


























































summarizes a candidate metric set we propose for consideration, with some data acquired from the Cambone et al 
UAS Roadmap.
2
  Figure 2 shows a cross-section of small UAS applicable for a wide variety of local-area 
operations, while Figure 3 shows two of the most common long-range, high-altitude large UAS models operated by 
public and civil US agencies, Predator and Global Hawk.   Figure 4 shows an example UAS ground control station 
developed by NASA; while this example is intentionally similar to a transport aircraft cockpit, the UAS pilots 
remain necessarily separated from the UAS, a critical distinction that will impact numerous CFRs as illustrated 
above for 23.143.  As is clear from these figures, the set of possible UAS configurations is perhaps even more varied 
than the set of manned aircraft configurations for which the CFRs were defined.  Their operational uses are equally 
diverse.  While UAS CFRs must be responsive to the formidable set of possible attribute-value combinations 
depicted in Table 2, the number of distinct classifications must be minimized to avoid attempts to develop an 
unmanageable set of UAS CFRs.   
Indoor/Outdoor platforms (e.g., Quadrotor)















Honeywell T-Hawk MAV   
(http://www.thawkmav.com/) 
Manned Aircraft Simulation
via UAS (NASA’s AirSTAR)
http://www.flightglobal.com/assets/getAsset.aspx?ItemID=34795
Figure 2:  Example Small UAS Platforms. 
 
                    
a)  Ikhana (modified Predator B) Aircraft. b) Global Hawk Advanced Concept Aircraft. 
Figure 3:  Example Large UAS Platforms ; aircraft shown here are operated by NASA Dryden Flight 

































































Table 2:  Potential UAS Classification Metrics. 
Attribute Value 
Airframe Type Fixed-wing, rotary-wing, flapping-wing, glider, lighter-than-air, hybrid 
Weight/Mass Group 1 (<20 lbs), Group 2 (21-55 lbs), Group 3 (<1320 lbs), Group 4/5 (>1320 lbs) 
Propulsion/Power Single/multi-engine, propeller/jet/other, fuel/electric/solar/other 
Avionics Communication link(s), flight management system (autopilot) capabilities, onboard sensors, 
sense-and-avoid equipment, ground station / operator interface 
Trim States Maximum endurance/range/maneuverability trim states for climb, cruise, descent, loiter 
(i.e., airspeeds, flight path angles turn radii) 
Flight Envelope 
Constraints 
Minimum/maximum airspeed, flight path angle, turn radius, flight ceiling, range, endurance 
Mission Recon/surveillance, attack, communications, science, entertainment, transport, agriculture 
 (altitude(s), airspace occupations/transits, flight plan predictability, launch/recovery, 
priority w/r/t other airspace users) 
Airspace Class Class A, B, C, D, E, G, (indoor) 
Traffic Density and 
Type 
{None, low, moderate, high},{manned/unmanned} 
Area of Operation Rural/suburban/industrial/urban, structure/paved/turf/sand/forest/crop/water, flat/rugged 
 
Airworthiness certification must fundamentally be based on safety. UAS operations have a critical difference not 
envisioned by the current CFRs:  they can crash and not pose risk to people or valuable property.  For UAS, safety is 
only compromised when potentially damaging kinetic energy is deposited by the UAS onto a manned aircraft or into 
terrain potentially occupied by people or property.  Energy is a function of aircraft mass and relative speed on 
impact, while risk of impact with occupied terrain or other aircraft is a function of airspace class, area of operation, 
traffic density, and robustness of avionics/automation as well as the ground station link.  UAS type informs safety 
certification regulations in terms of the range of energies the platform might deposit, the manner in which the UAS 
(and its operator) can minimize or redirect UAS energy to minimize or eliminate potential risk, and the set of critical 
systems that must be functioning to ensure the UAS can manage and direct its energy in a manner that maintains 
acceptable risk levels.    UAS missions define the spectrum of flight profiles/plans over which safety must be 
preserved.  These will inform the analyst regarding expected airspace occupation, predictability/availability of 4D 
flight plans, and the suite of maneuvers the UAS might elect over its mission (e.g., 4D waypoint following, target 
following, loitering, aggressive maneuvers).  The UAS environment is defined in terms of expected and actual 
traffic density/types/missions as well as overflight region attributes.  Environments will range from rural with no 
other air traffic expected to urban with high air traffic densities.  The CFRs must ultimately cover the spectrum of 
{type, mission, environment} classes, building from the simplest {small UAS, low-altitude maneuvers, UAS test 
                                                 
§ UAS ground stations typically contain glass cockpit and video elements shown here. While no regulatory standards exist for 
UAS ground station design, the NASA AirSTAR configuration appears more like a traditional cockpit than do most UAS ground 


























































range)} case for which current flight termination procedures are acceptable given that UAS energy deposited on 
impact will be transferred only to unimproved terrain.  The above attribute sets must be translated to quantitative 
metrics (e.g., for energy, environment) over which CFR categories may be established and evaluated.   With this 
paper we encourage the community to establish metrics appropriate across the different types, missions, and 
environments each operator is targeting.  Once such metrics are established, we can formally analyze the alternatives 
for remote decision-making versus autonomous (intelligent systems) algorithms over the spectrum of situations we 
anticipate as well as those scenarios we don’t expect until they are encountered and catalogued, further refining the 
UAS-centric or UAS-accommodating CFRs as the community further matures.     
VI. Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper has examined the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) for aircraft (Part 23) and airmen (Part 61) 
with the goal of identifying their applicability for UAS operations.  While most of the CFRs examined require some 
adaptation, many of these changes are minor, with major changes revolving around the migration from onboard 
pilotage to onboard autonomous flight management with remote supervision and from minimizing risk to aircraft 
occupants to minimizing risk to people and property on the ground and in other [manned] aircraft.  We proposed 
adaptation/extension of Part 23 to establish UAS-relevant airworthiness standards, because many existing 
regulations could be readily adapted.  Alternatively, a new subpart of the CFRs could be created, addressing gaps in 
automation, instrumentation, and the link to an offboard ground station as a critical part of the system.  Such 
specifics are beyond the scope of this paper but are critical to consider in future work.  Addition of one or more new 
Part 61 subparts for UAS operators will also be required, consistent with the numerous subparts already in place for 
airmen ranging from sport to airline transport pilots.  We proposed the development of safety evaluation metrics that 
incorporate attributes that are derived from UAS type, mission, and operating environment, since risks to people and 
property imposed by the UAS is necessarily a function of all these attributes.  This paper introduces far more 
challenges than it addresses.  A full revision of the CFRs to accommodate UAS is a long-term process that must be 
supported by the UAS community, the FAA, and ultimately by the public.   Careful evaluation of safety for 
emerging UAS and their missions in the context of the CFRs as well as software and system risk analysis represents 
an essential step toward integration in the NAS. 
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